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I. INTRODUCTION
When film production costs in California skyrocketed in the 1990s, 
states began creating tax-incentive programs to attract film industry 
production. Currently, thirty-seven states have some type of movie-
production incentives for production of television, video, and film, and 
twenty-two states or U.S. territories offer film tax credits.1 As of August 
2015, more than seventy percent of motion picture production is outside 
of California in states such as Georgia, Louisiana, and New York.2 
The recently released movie Divergent, based on a science fiction 
book trilogy that takes place in a future post-apocalypse Chicago, cost 
$85 million to create, $30 million of which was spent in Illinois.3 The 
film’s producers promised to produce 1,000 jobs, and in return received 
over $5 million in Illinois film tax credits. Did the reduction of tax 
revenue collected by the state of Illinois result in net economic growth?4 
States have limited resources and cannot afford costly multi-
million-dollar tax-incentive programs for the film industry that do not 
produce the promised results. Though several academic articles have 
examined international incentives that encourage the filming of U.S. 
movies and television shows outside of the U.S., relatively few articles 
discuss the problems caused by states competing among each other for 
domestic film production.5 
1. NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE FILM PRODUCTION INCENTIVES & PROGRAMS
(2016); See also infra Appendix A (providing a table listing each state’s current incentive program 
with state statute reference) (the term “film” refers to the activity associated with the production of 
motion pictures, television programs, commercials, and other related activities). 
2. See Infra Section I.D.
3. See Press Release, Office of Governor Pat Quinn, Governor Quinn Announces Summit
Entertainment’s “Divergent” Set to Film in Illinois (Jan. 14, 2013), 
https://www.illinois.gov/dceo/whyillinois/Film/Media/PressReleases/01.14.13_pressrelease.pdf; 
Ruth L. Ratny, $40mm sci-fi “Divergent” starts filming here in April, REEL CHICAGO (Jan 08, 
2013), http://www.reelchicago.com/article/40mm-sci-fi-divergent-starts-filming-here-april130108.  
4. Infra Section II.B(1) (The answer is discussed.).
5. See Adrian McDonald, Down the Rabbit Hole: The Madness of State Film Incentives as a 
“Solution” to Runaway Production, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 85 (Fall 2011) (advocating a national film 
incentive modeled after existing California and New York incentive programs to end the 
competition among states and to prevent American film production from going to foreign countries, 
based on economic rationale); Eric Homsi, Financing Films One State At A Time: A Survey of 
Successful Film Incentive Programs, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 49 (reviewing film 
incentive programs in California, New York, and New Mexico); Claire Wright, Hollywood’s 
Disappearing Act: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home, 39 AKRON L. REV. 
739 (2006) (discussing whether subsidies provided by foreign countries for their domestic film 
industry could be challenged under the World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures); Paul Battista, “Runaway” Film and Television Production: Carrots, 
Sticks, & International Tax Reform, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 243 (suggesting changes to 
the U.S. tax system to make foreign government tax incentives that entice U.S. taxpayer investment 
2
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This Article examines the effectiveness of state tax incentives for 
the film industry and proposes solutions for more effective and efficient 
use of state tax revenue to promote economic development. It argues that 
many states are wasting tax revenue on tax incentives to the film 
industry that do not result in net economic growth. Part II of the Article 
describes the current types of state tax incentives; California’s initial 
dominance of U.S. film production; a brief overview of foreign and U.S. 
film-production incentives; and the expansion of the use of tax 
incentives outside of California. Part III examines the issues by 
measuring the effectiveness of the state tax incentives for the film 
industry; describes examples of programs that failed to produce net 
economic growth; and discusses current trends in state programs. Part IV 
proposes a framework for economically effective state tax-incentive 
programs for the film industry: (1) require states to reexamine the need 
for film industry incentive programs; (2) institute limits on incentives 
awarded with annual caps or funding tied directly to state budget 
appropriation; and (3) create more accountability of performance of film 
industry production companies. 
II. OVERVIEW OF FILM INDUSTRY STATE TAX INCENTIVES
This section will provide an overview of state tax incentives 
provided to the film industry. First, it will describe the different types of 
state tax incentives. It will then analyze California’s initial dominance in 
using incentive programs. After discussing the movement of U.S. film 
production outside of the U.S., this section will then conclude by 
exploring the development of state tax incentives in states other than 
California. 
A. Types of State Incentives
State film incentives vary and include income tax credits, cash
rebates, grants, sales and use tax credits or exemptions, and other 
incentives that reduce the cost of doing business. In a January 2010 
special report by Tax Foundation, an independent nonprofit, nonpartisan 
tax-research group, each type of state film industry incentive was 
reviewed.6 The table below summarizes the state film industry 
incentives typically used by states, as reviewed in the Tax Foundation 
of film production in foreign countries more equitable). 
6. William Luther, Movie Production Incentives: Blockbuster Support for Lackluster Policy, 
TAX FOUND. (January 2010), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/sr173.pdf.  
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report.7 
Table 1 
Income Tax Credit Dollar for dollar reduction of income tax liability for 
expenditures for qualified film production expense, 
hiring of labor, or investment in local infrastructure 
Cash Rebate State reimbursed for portion of qualified expense 
State Grant State funds offered for qualified expense 
Sales & Use Tax 
Exemption 
Exemption from state sales tax of qualified expenditures 
Lodging Exemption Lodging reimbursement for film production cast and 
crew for hotel stays of at least 30 days 
Other tax incentives Exemption, credit or deferral (abatement) of 
excise taxes, inventory taxes, and other state or 
local taxes or fees 
Tax credits are the most prevalent state film incentive, with twenty-
two of the thirty-seven states that provide some type of film-production 
incentives offering tax credits.8 These credits are generally based on a 
statutorily created percentage of qualified film and television expenses.9 
The definition of “qualified expenses” differs by state.10 However, most 
states include in their definition expenses identified as “above-the-line” 
expenses, which are wages paid and fees associated with the director, 
writers, and leading actors.11 Some states include the so-called “below-
the-line” expenses, which include other film production costs including 
wages for crew, production staff, and non-leading cast members.12 Most 
state tax credits are transferable or refundable, which allows film 
production companies to sell their credits to third parties.  States realize 
that many film production companies would not have enough state tax 
liability to be offset by that tax credit, thus making much of the tax 
credit worthless. This Article will collectively refer to all state film 
industry incentives as state tax incentives for the film industry. 
7. See generally id. 
8. See infra Section II.D.
9. See MAC TAYLOR, FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF MOTION PICTURE 
INDUSTRY AND STATE TAX CREDITS 19 (2014).  
10. Id. at 18. 
11. Id. at 15. 
12. N.Y. TAX LAW § 24(b)(2) (McKinney 2016) (the state of New York includes “below the
line” expenses in its definition of qualified production costs). 
4
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B. Earlier California Dominance
California became a key state in the development of the U.S. film
industry in the early twentieth century.13 California’s dominance in film 
production in the U.S. was primarily due to the availability of 
inexpensive educated labor, low-cost studio and production sites, and, of 
course, its moderate weather.14 Beginning in 1910, and through present 
day, the primary area of California for film production has been the Los 
Angeles area—”Hollywood.”15 During its zenith of film production in 
the mid-1990s, specifically 1997, California was responsible for 637 of 
823 film production starts—over seventy-seven percent of film 
production starts in the U.S.16 Also in 1997, sixteen of the top twenty-
five films were made in California.17 For the years 1995 through 1999, 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis measured California’s percentage 
of the U.S. film industry as ranging from 51% to 55% and its gross 
economic activity between $12 billion and $16 billion.18 
Table 2 
Size of California Share of U.S. Film Industry 
(Billions of Dollars) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
CA Films $12 $13 $15 $16 $16 
U.S. Films $22 $25 $26 $29 $30 
CA % of US Films 52% 53% 55% 54% 54% 
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), a trade 
13. See Gerben Bakker, The Economic History of the International Film Industry, EH.NET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 10, 2008), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-history-of-the-
international-film-industry/ (discussing the origins of the U.S. film industry). 
14. Id. at 8 (California offered lower cost of distribution of films compared to other locations
in North America and Europe); See Alexandra Gil, Breaking the Studios: Antitrust and the Motion 
Picture Industry, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 83, 88-89 (2008) (California also provided geographical 
distance from the antitrust and patent claims of northeastern film production companies); GENE 
FERNETT, AMERICAN FILM STUDIOS: AN HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (2001) (providing detail on 
the history of U.S. film production and the development of film studios and film production 
companies). 
15. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 10.
16. MARTHA JONES, MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION IN CALIFORNIA 2 (2002), available at
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/02/01/02-001.pdf (Table 9 provides the comparison of feature film 
production starts from 1994-1997).  
17. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 13-14 (Figure 6, the top 25 films produced is based on the
estimated worldwide box office revenues). 
18. Id. at 10 (Table 1). 
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association representing six major Hollywood film production 
companies, also provides statistics for that period in its 1998 report 
called the “State of the Industry” (the “1998 Report”).19 The 1998 
Report measured California’s share of the U.S. film industry at over 
eighty percent and a gross economic activity over $27.5 billion, 
significantly higher than the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
calculations.20 
C. U.S. Film Production Outside of the U.S.
1. Growth of Runaway Production
Regardless of which statistics more accurately represented
California’s dominance of the U.S. film industry in the 1990s, the U.S. 
film industry became an attractive industry to foreign countries.21 The 
concept of developing ideas for film production in the U.S. but filming 
outside of the U.S., known as “runaway production,” was not a new 
phenomenon in 1990.22 However, runaway production increased 
substantially in the 1990s primarily for economic reasons.23 In the 
1990s, lower production costs and government incentives made 
countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom more 
attractive for film production.24 Production costs were lower in 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom due to the decline of their 
currency exchange rate from fifteen percent to twenty-three percent 
compared to the U.S. dollar.25 Most notably, Australia and Canada 
provided tax credits that helped reduce production cost savings by ten 
percent.26 Canada’s tax-credit program, the more comprehensive of the 
two countries, was the Film or Video Production Services Tax Credit of 
1997 (CPTC).27 CPTC offered a twenty-five percent refundable tax 
19. Id. at 8. 
20. Id. 
21. Although this Article does not focus on issues created by the production of film and
television outside of the U.S., it makes sense to provide a cursory overview of foreign incentive 
programs. 
22. See Jones, supra note 16, at 35; see also MONITOR COMPANY, U.S. RUNAWAY FILM AND 
TELEVISION STUDY REPORT 2 (Director’s Guild of America/Screen Actors Guild 1999).  
23. MONITOR, supra note 22, at 4; Adrian McDonald, Through the Looking Glass: Runaway
Productions and “Hollywood Economics,” 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 879 (Summer 2007) (besides 
economic rationale, runaway production may also be based artistic rationale such as the location). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. c. 1 (5th Supp.) (1985) (Can.). 
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credit on qualified production costs. In addition to the CPTC, Canadian 
provincial tax credits were available, collectively providing tax credits of 
nearly fifty percent.28 From 1990 to 1998, Canada’s share of the total 
U.S. runaway productions (based on economics) grew from sixty-three 
percent in 1990 to eighty-one percent in 1998.29 
Facing increasing runaway production internationally, the U.S. film 
industry, represented primarily by the MPAA, lobbied Congress for 
federal tax incentives to combat this issue.30 Congress responded with 
the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the “Act”).31 
The Act provided the U.S. film industry with the following federal tax 
treatment: qualifying domestic film production for the manufacturing 
deduction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 199; immediate write-off of domestic 
film production expenditures pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 181; and favorable 
depreciation treatment of certain film production expenditures pursuant 
to 26 U.S.C. § 167.32 
2. Current Runaway Trends
The passage of the Act in 2004 appears to have curbed runaway
production. A 2013 study conducted by the research division of 
FilmL.A., Inc., a not-for-profit California regional film organization, 
found that forty-five percent of 108 major-studio productions released 
into theaters that year were primarily filmed in foreign countries.33 
FilmL.A.’s unique study tracks movies released within a year and 
determines where they were primarily filmed.34 Their study used a 
methodology that focused on live-action and animated movies released 
28. Id.; see KPMG, FILM FINANCING AND TELEVISION PROGRAMING: A TAXATION GUIDE
80 (6th Ed. 2012) (providing a comprehensive description of the current CPTC and provincial tax 
credit programs); see also Marsha Henry, Canada’s Federal and Provincial Film and Television Tax 
Incentives: Are They Worthwhile, and Can They be Improved (unpublished paper, Master of 
Taxation program, University of Waterloo) (marshahenry.blogs.com) (providing a detailed review 
of Canada’s tax credit system for film production). The current administration and procedures of the 
tax credit are available at the Canada Revenue Agency website, http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/tx/nnrsdnts/flm/ftc-cip/menu-eng.html. 
29. See MONITOR, supra note 22, at 9 (information from Exhibit 6 graph and chart). 
30. Homsi, supra note 5, at 151. 
31. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357 (2004). 
32. Homsi, supra note 5, at 151-156 (providing a detail analysis of the changes in federal tax 
treat for the film industry due to the American Job Creation Act of 2004 and amendments). 
33. ADRIAN MCDONALD, 2013 FEATURE FILM PRODUCTION REPORT 4-5 (2013).
34. Id. at 1 (The study is unique due to the methodology of focusing on global filming
locations of movies produced by U.S. Major and Mini-Major film production companies; studies 
conducted by individual states such as Florida, Michigan, and Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina are focused on state specific economic statistics for film 
production.). 
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by six major film production studios and five independent film 
production studios located in Southern California.35  In the 2013 study, 
notably, Canada had fifteen movie productions representing fourteen 
percent of the films, equaling the number of those filmed in California.36  
The United Kingdom had twelve films representing fourteen percent of 
all the films.37 FilmL.A. has completed subsequent film studies for 
201438 and 201539 using the same methodology. For those years, the 
U.S. has remained the primary film production location with sixty-four 
percent of films surveyed in 2014 and sixty-five percent of films 
surveyed in 2015.40 The table below summarizes the percentage shares 
of the U.S. film industry held by Canada, the U.K., and Australia:41 
Table 3 
Partial List by Country of Percentage Share of U.S. Film Industry 
Production 
Location 
2013 (108 
Films) 
2014 (106 
Films) 
2015 (109 
Films) 
Canada 15% 12 11 
U.K. 12% 15 15 
Australia 2% 3 1 
D. Rise of State Tax Incentives Outside of California
In addition to foreign countries like Canada and the United
Kingdom competing with California, the 1990s saw a rising number of 
states creating film-incentive programs to compete with California. In 
1992, Louisiana was the first state outside of California to offer tax 
35. Id. at 4 (“Majors” include Disney, Warner Brothers, NBCUniversal, Paramount, Sony
and 20th Century Fox; Independent studios known as “Mini Majors” include Dreamworks, 
Lionsgate, Weinstein Co., FilmDistrict, and Relativity.). 
36. Id. at 5. 
37. Id. 
38. ADRIAN MCDONALD, 2014 FEATURE FILM STUDY (2014) (The study methodology used
films produced by Major studios Disney, Warner Brothers, NBCUniversal, Paramount, Sony and 
20th Century Fox and Independent studios Dreamworks, Lionsgate, Weinstein Co., Summit 
Entertainment, and Relativity.). 
39. ADRIAN MCDONALD, 2015 FEATURE FILM STUDY 5 (2015) (The study methodology
used films produced by Major studios Disney, Warner Brothers, NBCUniversal, Paramount, Sony 
and 20th Century Fox and Independent studios Dreamworks, Lionsgate/Summit Entertainment, 
Weinstein Co., CBS, and Blumhouse.) (The 2016 Feature Film Production Report is scheduled to be 
finalized and published by May 2017.). 
40. MCDONALD, supra note 38, at 2. 
41. Id. at 3. 
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incentives for film production.42 Other states soon followed—Minnesota 
in 1997, Missouri in 1999, and New Mexico in 2002.43 North Carolina, 
New York, South Carolina, and Florida would later develop incentive 
programs that rivaled California’s.44 The attached Appendix A lists the 
current state film production incentive programs.45 By 2013, New York, 
Louisiana, Georgia, and Florida had larger film tax-credit programs than 
California.46 Louisiana, Georgia, and Florida did not “cap” or limit the 
film tax-credit programs annually. New York’s film tax credit was 
capped at $420 million. 
Table 4 
2013 State Film Tax Credit Programs 
(Dollars in Millions) 
State Incentive 
Percent 
Annual 
Cost 
New York 30-35 $420 
Louisiana 30-35 $236 
Georgia 20-30 $140 
Florida 20-30 $131 
California 20-25 $100 
In a FilmL.A., Inc. 2013 film study, Louisiana had overtaken 
California as the leading state in the U.S. for film location production. 
Of the 108 films surveyed, eighteen movies were primarily filmed in 
Louisiana and fifteen were filmed in California. In addition, California’s 
share of the top twenty-five highest grossing films decreased to twenty-
four percent, down from sixty-eight percent fifteen years earlier.47 By 
2014, California had regained the position as the top state location from 
Louisiana. Last year’s survey has California as the leading state location 
for the second year in a row. The survey for 2013, 2014, and 2015 is 
represented in the table below. 
42. Luther, supra note 6, at 2. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. See infra Appendix A.
46. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 15, 18 (table adapted from figure).
47. Id. at 14. 
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Table 5 
Partial List Surveyed Films Produced by U.S. Film Industry by 
State Location 
Production 
Location 
2013 
(108 
Films 
2014 
(106 
Films) 
2015 
(109 
Films) 
California 158 22 19 
Louisiana 18 5 12 
Georgia 9 10 12 
New York 4 13 7 
Pennsylvania 2 1 6 
Massachusetts 5 3 3 
North Carolina 4 2 3 
New Mexico 3 2 2 
Michigan 1 2 0 
III. MEASUREMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM
This section will analyze the effectiveness of tax-incentive
programs for the film industry. It will begin by explaining the economic 
impact analysis, which is the primary method of measuring the 
effectiveness of incentive programs. The section will then analyze the 
pitfalls of measuring the effectiveness of these incentive programs, such 
as the failure of the states to collect accurate data and the inability to 
consistently measure job creation. Next the section will explore the 
issues resulting from states’ “bidding” against one another with tax 
incentives to win production contracts. Finally, the current trends in the 
state tax-incentive film programs will examined. 
A. Economic Impact Analysis
The primary methodology to measure the effectiveness of incentive
programs is the economic impact analysis.48 The analysis is a 
quantitative technique that examines the change in economic activity as 
48. THE COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2012 STATE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES SURVEY REPORT (May 2013) at 27, http://members.c2er.org/
download/2012_Economic_Development_Program_Survey_Report.pdf (The survey includes state 
tax and non-tax incentive for economic development.). 
10
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the sum of direct effects, indirect effects, and induced effects.49 Direct 
effects are initial changes in employment, income, and output of a 
company.50 The hiring of film production employees such as camera and 
sound technicians is the direct effect of the film production company’s 
expenditures. Indirect effects are changes in employment, income, and 
output due to a company’s expenditures and purchases.51 An example of 
indirect effects is job creation of a business that supports the film 
production, such as the hiring of restaurant workers serving film 
production crews. Lastly, induced effects on the economy are the 
increased wages of individuals in unrelated industries.52 To measure the 
total effect of the incentives on the economy of the state, economists use 
a “multiplier” ratio to gauge the ripple effect of the initial company’s 
increase to economic activity.53 One of the most common software 
programs used to model the “ripple effect” is the Regional Economic 
Models Inc. (REMI).54 In September 2014, the Massachusetts 
Department of Revenue issued a report on the state’s film industry 
incentives.55 To illustrate the use of the REMI, the following diagram 
was used by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue:56 
Minus 
49. See Jonathan Q. Morgan, Analyzing the Benefits and Costs of Economic Development
Projects, U. N.C. SCH. GOV’T, Apr. 2010, at 2.  
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 3. 
54. Id. at 4-5. 
55. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, A REPORT ON THE
MASSACHUSETTS FILM INDUSTRY TAX INCENTIVES (2013).  
56. Id. (adapted visual from page 5). 
Wage and Non-Wage Spending Generated by the Tax Incentives 
And 
Economic Activity Generated by Spending (Positive “Multiplier” 
Impact) 
State Spending Cuts or Tax/Fee Increases Required to Maintain a 
Balanced Budget (Negative Economic Impact) 
And 
Additional State Economic Impact of Those State Spending Cuts or 
Tax/Fee Increases (Negative “Multiplier” Impact) 
11
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The table below describes the types of statistical information needed to 
do the economic impact analysis:57 
Table 6 
B. Problems with Measuring Economic Impact of Programs
1. Failure of States to Collect Accurate Data
In the beginning of this Article, I asked if filming the movie
Divergent in Chicago produced the economic results promised by the 
Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity’s Illinois 
Film Office (IFO) of 1,000 jobs and a net economic result of $30 
million. Without accurate data, there is no definitive answer—a problem 
like the ones encountered in similar tax-incentive programs. According 
to the IFO, the goal of the tax credit is “[t]o attract local vendors, union 
leaders, and filmmakers to the Illinois film industry in order to promote 
growth and job opportunities.”58 The IFO program grants film 
57. Adapted from COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, A 
REPORT ON THE MASSACHUSETTS FILM INDUSTRY TAX INCENTIVES 5 (2013). 
58.  See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY,
https://www.illinois.gov/dceo/whyillinois/Film/FilmTaxCredit/Pages/default.aspx; see also 35 ILL.
The total amount of tax credits claimed and paid during the fiscal 
year 
Estimate of film production activity that would have occurred in the 
state without tax incentives 
Amount spent on wage and non-wage spending for film productions 
that claimed the tax incentives 
Amount spent on wages and salaries that were paid to state residents 
and non-residents 
Amount spent on non-wages paid to state based and out-of-state 
businesses; 
Net number of new jobs generated by film productions that claimed 
the tax incentives, for both residents and non-residents 
Net increase in spending that occurred in state as a result of the film 
tax credits. 
Types of productions claiming the tax credits 
12
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production companies a tax credit of thirty percent of qualified film 
production spending incurred within a twelve-month period, and a thirty 
percent credit on Illinois salaries of up to $100,000 per worker.59 Only 
salaries of workers who are residents of Illinois qualify for the credit.60 
The IFO requires that the applicant receiving the tax credit “use its best 
efforts to supply information disclosing the number of production type 
jobs created and/or retained and whether the production type jobs were 
entry, management or skilled labor.”61 This “best efforts” standard 
creates the problem of inaccurate data because the quality of the data is 
subjective. The IFO does require applicants to use IFO-approved Illinois 
CPA firms in verifying the production costs being claimed for the 
receipt of the tax credit.62 The use of the approved-CPA-firm 
requirement is for the granting of the credit, not for verifying the results 
of the film production—namely the number of jobs produced and 
general economic benefit received by the state. The IFO is required to 
report at the end of each fiscal quarter to the Illinois General Assembly 
the economic impact of the tax-credit program, specifically including the 
number of jobs created and retained.63 Since the initiation of the Illinois 
film tax-credit program in 2008, the IFO has only submitted one 
quarterly report to the General Assembly, which is for the fourth quarter 
of fiscal year 2016.64 Based on the “best efforts” standard for 
verification of the economic benefits and the failure of the IFO to submit 
quarterly reports on the economic benefits of the tax credits, the claim of 
1,000 jobs created and a net $30 million benefit cannot be substantiated. 
The Illinois Policy Institute, an independent advocacy organization on 
government efficiency, also disputes the economic benefits created by 
the filming of the movie Divergent.65 They point out that the 1,000 jobs 
created were temporary and did not constitute full-time positions.66 
COMP. STAT. 16/5 (2008). 
59. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 16/10 (2008) (film production commencement on or after January 1, 
2009).  
60. Id.
61. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 528.62 (2013). 
62. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY,
https://www.illinois.gov/dceo/whyillinois/Film/FilmTaxCredit/Pages/FAQs.aspx (Frequently Asked 
Questions). 
63. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 16/45 (2008); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 528.40 (2007). 
64. ILLINOIS FILM PRODUCTION SERVICES TAX CREDIT QUARTERLY REPORT: FY2016 Q4 
APRIL 1, 2016–JUNE 30, 2016 (2016).  
65. Chris Andriesen, Spotlight on Spending #13: Illinois Film Tax Credit Program, ILLINOIS 
POLICY INSTITUTE (September 22, 2010), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/spotlight-on-
spending-13-%e2%80%aaillinois-film-tax-credit-program%e2%80%ac/. 
66. Id.; see also Michael Lucci, Illinois’ record film revenue: What’s the cost?, ILLINOIS 
13
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Illinois is not the only state with data accuracy issues. Marc 
Taylor’s reports on tax credits, requested by the California Legislature, 
suggest that collection of accurate data from film production is 
difficult.67 There is also the issue of whether economic growth is directly 
due to film incentives. A recent Massachusetts report on film incentives 
said a state must determine if economic development was due to the film 
tax incentives or other unknown economic factors.68 
2. Measuring Job Creation
As stated in Table 5, employment and wage statistics are vital to
conducting the economic impact analysis. States receive this data from 
employers that file quarterly employment and wage statistics. However, 
the employment and wage information from film production may 
include data from business generated, but not related to film production, 
and thus be overstated.69  For instance, the employment and wage data 
from another industry such as television broadcasting might be included 
in the information.70 The data might be understated if the employer of 
film production employees is considered the payroll company that 
contracts with the film production company or if actors, screenwriters, 
directors, and others work on a freelance basis and are not considered 
employees of the film production companies.71 Another problem with 
the accuracy of the employment and wage information is the definition 
of an “employee” as determined by the state.  Some states treat 
employees that work fewer than forty hours as a full-time equivalent 
employee.72 Other states include part-time employees in their statistics.73 
For instance, North Carolina allows counting of all people who work on 
film projects, regardless of how long they are employed or the number 
of hours they worked.74 New Mexico uses the number of “worker days” 
on a film by employees.75 Pennsylvania uses a full-time equivalent 
methodology.76 The differences in counting methodologies make it 
POLICY INSTITUTE (January 22, 2014), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-record-film-revenue-
whats-the-cost/.  
67. TAYLOR, supra note 9. 
68. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, supra note 57, at 2. 
69. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 7. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. MCDONALD, supra note 39, at 5. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
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nearly impossible to compare job growth state by state. Thus, some 
states with more liberal definitions of the hours required in order to be 
considered full-time, or states that include part-time employees, may 
overstate employment created by the film production incentive. 
C. Other Problems Created by State Film Production Incentives
Competition among states to attract film production companies can
result in several states “bidding” for the same film production. What is 
wrong with economic competition among states for film production? 
Robert Tannenwald, Senior Fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, posits that no state wins in a subsidy war to attract film 
production because they end up “paying” more in incentives than is 
necessary to attract film production.77 Some critics claim the 
competition among states results in an economic war among competing 
states where no state is a “winner” and there is a “zero-sum game.”78 
The Tax Foundation Report calls the competition for film production an 
“arms race of incentives.”79 On a national level, this competition does 
not produce a net economic gain because capital is simply relocating 
from one state to another.80 
It is also argued that the jobs created by film production are 
typically temporary.81 Once the film production has concluded the 
“jobs” end. In addition, many of the jobs created are not high paying.82 
The average camera operators earn between $23,000 and $57,000 a year, 
and film editors typically earn below $50,000 a year.83 Moreover, most 
of the skilled jobs go to out-of-state residents. 84 Thus, much of the 
employment impact on the state benefits non-residents. 
D. Failed Programs
Several states have conducted impact studies to determine if their
film-industry tax incentives resulted in net economic gain.85 The state of 
77. ROBERT TANNENWALD, STATE FILM SUBSIDIES: NOT MUCH BANG FOR TOO MANY
BUCKS (2010) at 8. 
78. Id.; see also Jonathan Q. Morgan, Using Economic Development Incentives: For Better
or for Worse, 74 POPULAR GOV’T 16, 16 (2009). 
79. Luther, supra note 6, at 14. 
80. Id. at 15. 
81. TANNENWALD, supra note 77, at 7. 
82. Id. at 1. 
83. Id. at 6. 
84. Id. 
85. See examples of Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania and South Carolina
15
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Massachusetts conducted studies from 2006 through 2012. 
Massachusetts is estimating a net loss of tax revenue due to its film-
production tax credits of $54.6 million in 2013 and over $75 million in 
2014.86 The Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation 
(LAEDC) conducted studies to estimate the economic benefits of 
California’s tax-credit program and determined the net economic 
benefits in 2013 have been consistently overstated.87 
In addition to problems of net losses, some state film tax-incentive 
programs have been marred by fraud and scandals. A film director was 
found guilty of filing a false tax credit filing with the Massachusetts 
Department of Revenue.88 Fraud committed by Iowa’s film office chief 
and six filmmakers led the Iowa state legislature to suspend the state’s 
film tax-incentive program.89 
E. Current Trends in State Film Incentive Programs
Uncertainty in state budgets and increasing pressure by taxpayer
advocacy groups have caused some states to reduce or eliminate their 
film incentive programs.90 Since 2009, ten states have effectively ended 
their film incentive programs by repealing statutes or allowing sunset 
provisions within statutes to effectuate.91 In fiscal year 2016, Alaska, 
Michigan, and New Jersey reduced their programs.92 The Alaska 
legislature moved up the sunset of its film tax-credit program from 2018 
to 2016.93 Michigan ended its film incentives beginning in fiscal year 
2016.94 In January 2016, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie vetoed the 
state legislature’s bill that would have revived the state’s film tax-credit 
studies. 
86. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, A REPORT ON THE
MASSACHUSETTS FILM INDUSTRY TAX INCENTIVES (2014). 
87. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 23. 
88. Robert W. Wood, Beware Film and Other Tax Shelter Deals, FORBES (June 5, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/05/beware-film-and-other-tax-shelter-deals-that-
go-criminal/#3f45dc7c533e. 
89. Richard Verrier, Iowa film tax credit program racked by scandal, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/19/business/la-fi-ct-onlocation-20110119. 
90. NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 1. 
91. Id. 
92. Id.; see also Elaine S. Povich, Some States Yell “Cut!” on Film Tax Credits, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 18, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2015/5/18/some-states-yell-cut-on-film-tax-credits. 
93. Press Release, Governor Bill Walker, The State of Alaska, Governor Signs Bill Ending
Film Tax Credits (Jun. 16, 2015).  
94. 2015 Mich. Pub. Acts 117. 
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program, which had expired in July 2015.95 North Carolina was another 
state that allowed its film tax credit to expire on January 1, 2015.96 
Some states have placed limits on grants of film tax incentives. The 
Louisiana legislature established a cap on film tax credits of $180 
million for the next three years.97 Other states, like Maryland, 
maintained their programs. Maryland’s film production tax-credit 
program was set to sunset on June 30, 2016.98 However, Maryland 
maintained the film tax credit and the cap of $7.5 million for fiscal year 
2017 and for the foreseeable future.99 Ironically, a September 2015 
report of the Maryland Department of Legislative Services (DLS) did 
not recommend extending the film production tax credit because it 
determined that the credit did not create sustainable economic 
development.100 The DLS report found the state provided $62.5 million 
in tax credits between fiscal years 2012 and 2016 while only receiving 
approximately $3.8 million in net revenue.101 Notwithstanding these 
findings, the Maryland legislature agreed to extend the film tax credit at 
its current level, but the amount of credit granted may not exceed the 
amount of money appropriated to the reserve fund in the state budget.102 
The intent of extending the credit was to maintain the current level of 
film production in the state, and to attract new film production activity to 
the state.103 
Contrary to the trend to reduce or eliminate state film incentive 
programs, at least three states have expanded their programs. Kentucky 
lowered spending thresholds for qualified film production expenses from 
$500,000 to $250,000 and increased its film tax credit from twenty 
percent to thirty percent.104 The increases to Kentucky’s film incentive 
program were proposed by state representative Rick Rand in House Bill 
340, and were supported by the Kentucky Tourism Development 
Finance Committee, Governor Steve Beshear, and first lady Jane 
Beshear.105 In testimony supporting the bill, first Lady Jane Beshear 
95. N.J.S.A. 54:10A-5.39; P.L. 2005, c. 345; P.L. 2007, c. 257; P.L. 2010, c. 20. 
96. See N.C. FILM OFF., https://www.filmnc.com/refundable-tax-credit.html. 
97. L.A. R.S. 47:6007 C. (1)(d)(ii)(aa). 
98. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §10-730 (West 2015). 
99. S. B. 905 (Md. 2015). 
100. MD. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, EVALUATION OF THE MARYLAND FILM 
PRODUCTION ACTIVITY CREDIT (2015) at vii-viii. 
101. Id. at ix-x. 
102. Id. at iv. 
103. Id. (Two film productions mentioned in the DLS report were for the filming of the Home
Box Office series “Veep” and Netflix’s production of “House of Cards.”). 
104. H. B. 340 (Ky. 2015). 
105. Fiona Young-Brown, Kentucky Improves Film and TV Incentives - Newly Improved
17
Pollard: "Cut - and That's a Wrap"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
442 AKRON LAW REVIEW [50:425 
testified that Kentucky’s film incentive program had become less 
desirable than those of thirty other states in attracting film production.106 
Governor Beshear signed House Bill 340 into law May 7, 2015.107 The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will increase the maximum available 
tax credits from $60 million to $65 million, beginning in fiscal year 
2017.108 The increase does not meet the one-time maximum of the 
program of $75 million, but demonstrates the state’s commitment to 
compete for film production.109 California made the most significant 
increase. California increased its $100 million annual cap on film tax 
credits to $230 million for fiscal year 2015-2016 and $330 million 
through fiscal year 2019-2020.110 California’s rationale for increasing its 
incentives is not surprising. Since 2013, when Louisiana surpassed 
California in film production, California legislators have consistently 
sought legislative efforts to regain California’s dominance in film 
production. By spring 2016, California had nine approved film 
production projects estimated at $313 million in direct qualified in-state 
spending.111 
Production Business Incentives Hold Promise to Boost State’s Film and TV Sector, THE LANE REP. 
(June 10, 2015), http://www.lanereport.com/49980/2015/06/kentucky-improves-film-and-tv-
incentives/. 
106. Id.; see Gov. Beshear signs Kentucky film incentives bill, WKYT (May 7, 2015),
http://www.wkyt.com/home/headlines/Gov-Beshear-signs-Kentucky-film-incentives-bill-
303014091.html (First Lady Beshear states “This legislation gives Kentucky-based filmmakers and 
production companies a leg-up by offering incentives that help curb their film production costs . . . . 
These incentives will help create a heightened interest for both local and outside filmmakers to seek 
out Kentucky as a premier filming destination, and I look forward to the many new exciting projects 
that will come about as a result of HB340.”). 
107. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.0205 (West 2014). See Young-Brown, supra note 105
(Governor Beshear states “House Bill 340 gives Kentucky a strong advantage when competing with 
other states for outside film projects . . . . Increased film production in Kentucky means a boost to 
local economies and an opportunity to highlight the Bluegrass state on both big and small screens 
across the world.”). 
108. H. B. 1198, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015); see also Tim Schooley,
Pennsylvania film tax credit to increase, PITTSBURGH BUSINESS TIMES (2016), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2016/07/14/pennsylvania-film-tax-credit-to-
increase.html. 
109. Schooley, supra note 108. 
110. Assemb. B. No. 1839 (Ca. 2014); see also Dominic Patten, Hooray For Hollywood! Gov.
Brown Signs Film & TV Tax Credit Bill Extension, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (September 18, 2014), 
http://deadline.com/2014/09/california-film-tv-tax-credit-bill-signed-jerry-brown-hollywood-
836075/. 
111. Elyse Glickman, Tax Credits Inspire a Hollywood Homecoming, L.A. BUS. J. (March 9,
2016), http://labusinessjournal.com/news/2016/mar/09/tax-credits-inspire-hollywood-homecoming/.  
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IV. PROPOSALS TO ASSIST STATES IN ACCOUNTING FOR PROGRAMS
States should consider their history of attracting film production in
determining whether film industry tax incentives are truly effective. 
How realistic is it that the program will attract the film industry? Should 
there be a limit on the amount of tax incentives granted, and what should 
the limit be based on? Absent a particular geographic location within a 
state, which would be hard to duplicate in a studio, some states should 
not participate in a competition for film production. As previously 
mentioned, some states have eliminated, reduced, or limited the granting 
of film tax incentives. But, these proposals are meant to address issues 
with current programs. This section makes three proposals. It first 
emphasizes the importance of states’ collecting reliable data on the 
economic impact of tax incentives, as well as the standardization 
between states in their evaluation criteria. Second, it then proposes how 
limits should be established and applied to the funding of film tax 
incentives. Third, this section discusses the significance of the states in 
requiring film production companies to provide accurate performance 
data. 
A. Reliable Data on Film Tax Incentives and Standardization
States are using different standards regarding the type of data that
should be used to calculate the economic impact of state film tax 
incentives.112 These differences in standards distort the calculation of 
effectiveness and allow states with lower standards to mask 
inefficiencies of their programs. States must adopt standardized methods 
to measure the expenditures of film production companies and jobs 
created by their activities. An agreement among states for 
standardization of definitions and measurement will also address the 
current “bidding war” problem among states for film production. Adrian 
McDonald proposed a national, rather than state-based, incentive 
program to combat the bidding war and “race to the bottom” among 
states offering film incentive programs, which would require federal 
action and legislation.113 His national film incentive would convert the 
IRC § 181 deduction for film expenditures to a national tax credit and 
would model existing state incentive programs such as California and 
112. MCDONALD, supra note 39, at 19. 
113. McDonald, supra note 5, at 158-162 (McDonald suggests a national incentive model to 
combat the competition among the states based on California and New York’s existing incentive 
programs).  
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New York.114 My proposal focuses on cooperation among the states 
offering film incentives to accept standard definitions and measurements 
to assist state economic development offices in evaluating data and 
measuring the economic impact of their incentives. My standardization 
proposal would be analogous to the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement (SSUTA).115 The SSUTA was created as a result of a 
meeting of the National Governors’ Association, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, the Federation of Tax Administrators, 
and the Multistate Tax Commission and was adopted by the original 
nine member states on November 12, 2002.116 The purpose of SSUTA is 
to simplify the administration of sales use tax among states through 
standardization.117 As with the SSUTA, my proposal will standardize 
key terms and definitions typically used by states in their film tax-
incentive programs such as qualified film production expenditures and 
what constitutes a full-time equivalent job for purposes of measuring job 
creation. 
B. Limits on Funding of Film Tax Incentives
To control potential net losses, states should fund film tax
incentives through state budget appropriations. Tax incentives would be 
limited by the legislatively-approved state budget. State legislators 
setting annual caps to the costs of funding film tax incentives would 
limit their cost and help prevent net losses in tax revenue. Some states 
have been forced to account for the amount of film tax incentives. For 
example, Louisiana recently instituted an annual cap on its film tax 
credits due to mounting pressure to account for economic benefits.118 In 
addition, Maryland extended its film tax credit for fiscal year 2017 and 
beyond, but restricted the granting of the credit to money available in the 
reserve fund of the state budget.119 The key to successfully limiting film 
114. Id. at 164-165. 
115. See STREAMLINE SALES TAX, http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/ (The Streamlined
Sales and Use Tax Agreement is an agreement among twenty-four member states to simplify the 
administration of sales and use tax collection.).  
116. John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Stand for the
Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 345-46 (2003) (The meeting was prompted among these 
associations and entities to formulate solutions to the complex state sales tax systems that had 
resulted from U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 
753 (1967), and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), which held that a state cannot 
require a retail seller that does not have physical presence in the state to collect sales and use tax.).  
117. THE STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT, § 102 (2016). 
118. See Povich, supra note 92. 
119. See MD. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, supra note 100. 
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tax incentives to the amount appropriated in a balanced budget is to 
encourage state legislators to regularly evaluate the fiscal impact of tax 
incentives.120 It is not enough to simply require state film incentive 
offices to report economic benefits to the state legislature. State 
legislatures must have enforcement powers to force regular reporting of 
the economic impact of tax credit programs. 
C. Accountability of Businesses for Performance
To assist states in enforcing covenants, contractual conditions, and
promises of expenditure and job creation made by film production 
companies, states should rigorously require specific performance. 
Specific performance provisions should be incorporated in contractual 
agreements with film production companies in the form of “claw-back” 
or recapture provisions. States should also consider requiring film 
production companies to post bonds to ensure that states may readily 
recover for failure to meet covenants. Film production companies must 
be accountable for their promise of economic activity or be forced to 
repay the monetary value of tax incentives received. This issue, being 
addressed by more states, is beginning to require oversight and 
evaluation of existing film tax-incentive programs.121 The number of 
states requiring audit verification or substantiation from production 
companies has risen from thirty-eight percent in 2014 to fifty-five 
percent in 2016.122 The trend of more states requiring accountability 
from film production companies is a positive step to resolving this 
problem, but also indicates the woeful percentage of states that do not 
have accountability within their programs. 
V. CONCLUSION
State tax incentives for the film industry will remain part of the 
economic development program of many states despite recent troubled 
programs and calls by public advocacy groups to reign in or eliminate 
such programs. Some states have reduced or eliminated their film 
industry incentive programs, but accountability remains an issue for the 
forty-five percent of states with film incentive programs that do not 
require audit verification or substantiation of the benefits gained from 
the programs. The U.S. film industry continues to grow and there is 
120. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, TAX INCENTIVE PROGRAMS-EVALUATE TODAY IMPROVE 
TOMORROW 8 (2015). 
121. NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 1. 
122. Id. 
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opportunity for states with well-developed programs and rigorous 
compliance standards to be successful—providing net economic growth 
from the granting of tax incentives to retain or attract film production. 
To truly account for economic growth from these programs, states must 
adopt standardized methods to measure the expenditures of film 
production companies and jobs created by their activities. If all states 
with these programs adopt these standards, state legislatures and the 
public will be able to more easily determine the success of such 
programs. These standards will also help create more reliable and 
accurate data to measure the success of a program. Linking the funding 
of these programs to a state’s budget process and limiting the 
appropriation of the funds for the programs to an annual basis will also 
help in managing the amount of incentives granted. Finally, states must 
be proactive in enforcing the covenants and promises made by film 
production companies and be willing to institute legal action to retrieve 
lost funds due to the failure to meet such covenants. For these proposals 
to be truly effective, all states granting tax incentives for the film 
industry must be willing to accept the standardized definitions and 
measurements. If only a few states agree to such provisions, they will be 
at a disadvantage as compared to other states who continue the “race to 
the bottom” to attract film production to their state. Adoption of these 
proposals will help prevent future “fleecing” of state economies. 
22
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Appendix A 
State Tax Credit and Incentive 
Program
Statute
Alabama 25% rebate on qualified 
expenditures; on state sales, 
use, and lodgings taxes.
Code of Ala. § 41-7A-43
Alaska Repealed Effective July 1, 
2015
Arizona No film incentive program. 
Program discontinued in 
2015
A.R.S. § 41-1517 (repealed) 
2012 Ariz. ALS 170 
Arkansas Tax credit of 30% qualified 
costs
A.C.A. § 15-4-2703
A.C.A. § 15-4-2705
A.C.A. § 15-4-2706
California 20% to 25% tax credit at 
maximum of $100 million
Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 
17053.85 
Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 
23685 
2011 Bill Tracking CA A.B. 
2026 
Colorado Tax credit of 20% qualified 
costs
C.R.S. 24-48.5-311 
(repealed) 
2012 Colo. ALS 186 
Connecticut 10%, 15%, and 30% tax credit 
based on level of qualified 
spending
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-217jj
Delaware No film incentive program
District of Columbia No film incentive program
Florida Entertainment industry 
financial incentive tax credit 
program; tax credits and cash 
rebate
73A-3.001, F.A.C. 
Fla. Stat. § 288.1254 
Georgia 20% tax credit on qualified 
investment in state; 10% tax 
credit qualified production 
activities on 
O.C.G.A. § 48-7-40.26
Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r.
560-7-8-.45
2011 Bill Text GA H.B. 386
Hawaii 20% to 25% refundable tax 
credit
HRS § 235-17
Idaho No film incentive program
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Illinois 30% of the qualified Illinois 
Production Spending and 30% 
on Illinois salaries up to 
$100,000 per worker
2007 ILL. ALS 720 
2007 Bill Text IL H.B. 2482 
35 ILCS 5/213 
35 ILCS 16/1 et seq. 
Indiana No film incentive program. Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 6-3.1-32-9
Iowa Repealed effective May 25, 
2012
Kansas No film incentive program K.S.A. § 79-32,258
Kentucky 20% refundable tax credit for 
qualifying production and post-
production related 
expenditures, payroll with a 
minimum in-state spend of 
$500,000.
KRS § 141.383 
KRS § 148.544 
Louisiana Repealed in 2016.
Maine 5% non-refundable tax credit 
on non-wage expenses; rebate 
and reimbursement on certain 
qualified expenditures
5 M.R.S. § 13090-L 
36 M.R.S. § 5219-Y 
Maryland Up to 25% refundable credit Md. TAX-GENERAL Code 
Ann. 
§ 10-730
2013 Bill Text MD S.B. 183
Massachusetts 25% production credit, payroll 
credit and sales tax exemption
ALM GL ch. 62, § 6 
2007 Mass. ALS 63 
Michigan Partial reimbursement of 
qualifying expenses
MCLS § 206.680 
MCLS § 208.1107 (repealed) 
MCLS § 208.1455 (repealed) 
MCLS § 208.1457 (repealed) 
MCLS § 208.1459 (repealed 
Minnesota 20-25% reimbursement of 
qualified expenses
Mississippi 25% rebate on investment; 
30% on resident payroll; 25% 
on non-resident payroll 
Miss. Code Ann. § 57-89-7 
Rule 35.X.09 
Missouri No film incentive program
Montana Repealed effective January 1, 
2015
Nebraska No film incentive program
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Nevada Beginning Jan. 1, 2014 
transferable tax credit of 15-
19%
New Hampshire No film incentive program
New Jersey 20% refundable tax credit on 
qualified expenditures - See if 
Program is suspended
N.J. Stat. § 54:10A-5.39
New Mexico 25% tax rebate (credit) on 
qualifying expenses
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-2F-1
New York 30% refundable tax credit NY CLS Tax § 24 
NY CLS Tax § 28 
NY CLS Tax § 33 
NY CLS Tax § 34 
NY CLS Tax § 210 
North Carolina 25% refundable tax credit N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-129.56
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.47
North Dakota No film incentive program
Ohio Refundable tax credit that 
equals 25% off in-state and 
non-resident wages, and 35% 
in Ohio resident wages on 
eligible productions
ORC Ann. 122.85
Oklahoma Repealed effective January 1, 
2014
Oregon 20% cash rebate on qualifying 
expenses; sales and use and 
lodging tax exemption
ORS § 315.514
Pennsylvania 25% tax credit on qualified 
expenditures
72 P.S. § 8702-D 
72 P.S. § 8712-D – 8719-D 
Rhode Island 25% transferable tax credit R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-31.2-1
South Carolina 25% cash rebate on wages; 
sales tax exemption up to 
$250,000
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-3570
South Dakota No film incentive program
Tennessee 25% cash rebate; refund of 
hotel occupancy and sales tax
Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-
2109 
H.B. 3839, Laws 2012 
Texas 5-20% cash payment for
qualified expenses 
Utah Cash rebate of 20-25% Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-614.5
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Vermont Hotel tax exemption, sales and 
use tax exemption
Virginia 15% tax credit for qualifying 
expenses including wages
Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-439.12:03
Washington Funding assistance up to 30% 
qualified expenditures
West Virginia Up to 31 % transferable tax 
credit
W. Va. Code § 11-13X-3
Wisconsin No film incentive program
Wyoming 15% cash rebate
123 
123. Adapted from Lexis Multistate Tax Charts with Analysis; Corporate Income Tax Credits; 
and chart from National Conference of State Legislatures, State Film Production Incentives & 
Programs (March 28, 2014).   
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